A few facts: An offshoot of Al Qaeda, the
Islamic State, known as I.S., ISIS or ISIL, is now being defined as much
or more by its differences from Al Qaeda as by its similarities. Unlike
Al Qaeda, I.S. seeks to gain and hold territory. It is a transnational
movement that threatens the existing regional order and thus the global
economy. I.S. is smart, media-savvy and rich, taking over banks,
businesses and oil fields in the area it administers. About four million
people now live in areas I.S. controls, where it acts as a state,
providing security and social services. According to Haroon Ullah, who
serves on Secretary of State John Kerry’s policy planning staff, it is
the largest extremist organization in the world.
In proclaiming itself a caliphate, the
Islamic State signaled it does not recognize the borders of the existing
nations in the region but wants to incorporate these nations within
itself. The jihadists seek to provoke a massive military intervention
from the West like the one that brought down the Soviet Union in
Afghanistan.
While many Americans view Islam as a violent
religion, studies show that the primary drivers of Islamic terrorism
are political. In fact, a high proportion of people in I.S., higher even
than in Al Qaeda, are religious novices who know little about Islam.
They see themselves as purifying the Islamic world, but their tactics
and behavior are so clearly un-Islamic that they have little credibility
as Muslims. What I.S. does offer, however, is a powerful change
narrative. In Syria, where I.S. is the most brutal and effective
opposition group, it is unifying people who would not naturally be
unified.
What are the challenges in mounting a
coalition against I.S.? They begin with the question of whether the
United States should lead it, the unresolved contradictions in U.S.
policy—the strongest foes of I.S. are Iran, Hezbollah and the Assad
regime, parties the United States treats as enemies—the fact that
military might alone cannot defeat an ideology and the fractured nature
of the coalition the United States is assembling.
Authoritarian countries like Saudi Arabia,
the United Arab Emirates and Egypt are now waging an undeclared war on
moderate Islamists—especially the Muslim Brotherhood—whom they see as a
greater threat to their hold on power than extremists. The actions they
are taking to suppress dissent at home threaten to fuel radicalization
and terrorism at a faster rate than they are fighting it. They reinforce
the argument made by I.S. that an Islamic state can only come about
through violence.
The United States has to go beyond blunt
militarism or the narrow counterterrorism approach outlined in the
president’s speech, Mideast experts say.
“We are trying to once again apply air power
to a problem or set of problems that it can’t resolve,” said Chas W.
Freeman, a retired diplomat who served as U.S. ambassador to Saudi
Arabia during the Desert Storm and Desert Shield operations. “I think
the so-called Islamic State is a serious threat that has to be
addressed, but putting the United States in the lead to do so is a
mistake and will not work.”
At a minimum, the coalition needs
significant buy-in from Arab allies. “It’s going to have to look like a
Western/Arab/Muslim armada,” said John Esposito, chair of Georgetown
University’s center for Christian-Muslim understanding. “Then they’re
going to have to be very strategic in what they do. You cannot have this
look like a primarily U.S.-led intervention and have a lot of
collateral damage.”
If all goes well, will the war against I.S.
be enough to staunch the further disintegration of the region? As long
as the violence continues in Iraq and Syria, probably not. While the
United States and its allies can militarily degrade I.S., that won’t be
sufficient to create peace or stability. Unfortunately, despite the
200,000 people killed there, neither the United States nor those waging a
proxy war in Syria seem serious about ending it.
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